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Abstract 
 
I discuss reasons why manufacturing productivity statistics should be interpreted with caution in 
light of the recent growth of domestic and foreign outsourcing and offshoring.  First, outsourcing 
and offshoring are poorly measured in U.S. statistics, and poor measurement may impart a 
significant bias to manufacturing and, where offshoring is involved, aggregate productivity 
statistics.  Second, companies often outsource or offshore work to take advantage of cheap 
(relative to their output) labor, and such cost savings are counted as productivity gains, even in 
multifactor productivity calculations.  This fact has potentially important implications for the 
interpretation of productivity statistics.  Whether, for instance, productivity growth derives from 
a better-educated, more efficient U.S. workforce, from investment in capital equipment in U.S. 
establishments, or from the use of cheap foreign labor affects how productivity gains are 
distributed among workers and firms in the short term and undoubtedly matters for U.S. 
industrial competitiveness and living standards in the long term.  Although it is impossible to 
fully assess the impact that mismeasurement and cost savings from outsourcing and offshoring 
have had on measured productivity growth in manufacturing, I point to several pieces of 
evidence that suggest it is significant, and I argue that these issues warrant serious attention.    
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 Employment in U.S. manufacturing began declining steadily in the late 1990s, and the 
decline accelerated dramatically after 2000.  Manufacturing employment was 19 percent lower in 
2005 than in 1998, even though manufacturing output was 10 percent higher.  One bright spot 
for U.S. manufacturing has been its extraordinary growth in productivity.  The rate of 
productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing increased in the mid-1990s, greatly outpacing that in 
the services sector and accounting for most of the overall productivity growth in the U.S. 
economy.  In a comparison with 14 other industrialized or newly industrialized countries, 
manufacturing productivity growth in the United States over the last decade was greater than that 
in all but two countries (BLS 2006, Table B).  These strong productivity statistics have been 
taken to imply that what remains of U.S. manufacturing is highly competitive in international 
markets and provides a solid basis for improvement of American workers’ living standards.   
 The drop in manufacturing employment coincided with an increase in outsourcing to 
domestic contractors, including staffing services, and an increase in outsourcing of materials and 
services inputs to foreign companies or affiliates, commonly known as offshoring.  Outsourcing 
and offshoring might plausibly result in higher productivity.  For instance, companies might use 
staffing agencies to more closely match worker use with actual production needs (Abraham 
1990; Ono and Sullivan 2006) or outsource noncore functions to domestic or foreign contractors 
with greater expertise in these areas (Erickcek, Houseman, and Kalleberg 2003).  Mann (2003) 
notes that the offshoring of much of the production in the IT sector resulted in lower prices of 
high tech equipment, which, she argues, stimulated the diffusion of high-tech equipment and the 
gains in productivity in the U.S. economy. Amiti and Wei (2004, 2006) also report evidence of a 
strong link between services offshoring and manufacturing productivity growth.  
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 However, the coincidence of U.S. productivity growth with the growth of outsourcing 
and offshoring has also raised concerns that strong productivity growth since the mid-1990s, 
particularly in manufacturing, is misleading and its implications misinterpreted.  Most analysis 
focuses on labor productivity measures, which in U.S. manufacturing are defined as constant 
dollar shipments divided by hours worked by manufacturing employees.  When manufacturers 
outsource or offshore work, labor productivity increases directly because the outsourced or 
offshored labor used to produce the product is no longer employed in the manufacturing sector 
and hence is not counted in the denominator of the labor productivity equation.  A 2004 study by 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) sought to allay concerns that the accelerated growth in 
manufacturing labor productivity was being driven in a mechanical way by outsourcing and 
offshoring.  It found that the contribution to manufacturing productivity growth from purchased 
services and materials-input purchases, which include domestic outsourcing and materials and 
services offshoring, actually declined over the 1990s.  The study thus concluded that outsourcing 
and offshoring could account for none of the acceleration of productivity growth witnessed in the 
latter half of the decade (BLS 2004).   
 In this paper I raise questions about the conclusion of that study.  I argue that even 
multifactor productivity measures, which were used in the BLS study and are designed to 
account for all inputs, should be interpreted with caution for two fundamental reasons.  First, 
measurement of outsourcing and offshoring in U.S. statistics is poor.  I present evidence that 
existing statistics greatly understate outsourcing by U.S. manufacturers to temporary help and 
related staffing agencies and thus may have missed much of manufacturers’ extensive 
outsourcing to this sector in recent years.  Recent government reports have raised similar 
concerns that data understate offshoring activities of U.S. companies because of the difficulty of 
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accurately measuring the prices and quantities of imported inputs (GAO 2004; National 
Academy of Public Administration 2006).    
 Second, besides greatly complicating the measurement of inputs needed to compute 
productivity statistics, outsourcing and offshoring may significantly alter what is counted as a 
productivity gain.  Companies often are motivated to outsource to domestic and foreign 
contractors or affiliates in order to exploit cheap (relative to their output) labor.  Although such 
cost savings do not accord with common perceptions of what constitutes productivity 
improvements, they are recorded as productivity gains in multifactor productivity calculations.  
Such cost savings likely are increasingly being captured in productivity statistics, and, with the 
growth of materials and services offshoring, affect not just sector but also aggregate productivity 
statistics.   
 Yet, this source of productivity growth and its implications are rarely noted in the 
productivity literature.1  The implications for who benefits from measured productivity growth 
are obvious and potentially important.  While any cost savings from outsourcing and offshoring 
are counted as productivity gains, outsourcing and offshoring simultaneously place downward 
pressure on manufacturing workers’ wages. Understanding the source of productivity gains is 
also important for understanding the implications of manufacturing productivity statistics for that 
sector as well as for the aggregate economy.  Whether productivity growth derives, for instance, 
from better-educated U.S. workers working more efficiently, from U.S. companies investing in 
high-tech capital in U.S. establishments, or from U.S. companies offshoring materials and 
services inputs to exploit cheap foreign labor no doubt matters for the long-term competitiveness 
                                                 
1Slaughter (2002) links productivity growth in the high-tech sector to the growth of global production networks and 
notes the low cost of foreign labor as one source of productivity gains.  He does not develop the implications of this 
point, however.  I am unaware of other work discussing labor cost savings from materials and services offshoring as 
a source of measured productivity growth.     
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of the U.S. economy and living standards of American workers, albeit in ways that currently are 
poorly understood.   
 Although it is impossible to determine the extent to which mismeasurement of inputs and 
these types of labor cost savings from outsourcing and offshoring have contributed to the recent 
growth of measured manufacturing productivity, I point to several pieces of evidence indicating 
that these factors are significant: 1) apparent understatement of the contribution of 
manufacturers’ outsourcing to the staffing sector in previous productivity statistics (Dey, 
Houseman, and Polivka 2006); 2) findings that services offshoring, which is likely to be 
significantly underestimated and associated with significant labor cost savings, accounts for a 
surprisingly large share of recent manufacturing multifactor productivity growth (Amiti and Wei 
2006); and 3) the small high-tech sector, which pioneered the development of global production 
networks and outsourced much of the work performed domestically, accounted for about a third 
of multifactor productivity growth in the U.S. economy in the late 1990s.  Together, this 
evidence makes a prima facie case that mismeasurement and labor cost savings from outsourcing 
and offshoring have significantly influenced measured manufacturing and, in the case of 
offshoring, aggregate productivity growth.  These issues, I argue, warrant further study.   
  
THE CONCEPT OF PRODUCTIVITY AND ITS MEASUREMENT 
 Productivity may increase because of an improvement in workers’ efficiency: workers 
can produce more output with any given amount of other inputs.  Reduction of slack time 
through more efficient assignment of workers to tasks is one example of how productivity may 
increase through this channel.  Productivity may also increase because of technological 
improvements, typically embodied in capital equipment, which allow for the production of more 
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output with any given amount of labor and other inputs.  The rapid development of computer 
technology and associated automation, for instance, is widely believed to have fueled 
productivity growth in developed economies in recent years.  Both sources of productivity 
growth accord with popular conceptions of what productivity improvements capture. 
 Although the broad concept of productivity is easy to understand, measuring productivity 
in a sector or in the aggregate economy is complex.  Two types of productivity statistics are 
computed: labor productivity and multifactor productivity.  Below, I discuss how these two 
productivity measures are constructed for the U.S. manufacturing sector.   
 
Measurement of Labor Productivity in U.S. Manufacturing 
 Most analysis focuses on labor productivity, which in U.S. manufacturing is computed as  
(1)           
0 0
t tQ L
Q L
÷ ,  
where        is the index of output in the current period (current period output divided by output in 
the base period) and       is the index of labor in the current period (current period labor input 
divided by labor input in the base period).  Output in the manufacturing sector is measured as the 
value of shipments, in constant dollars, from manufacturing establishments adjusted for 
inventory change and net of intra-industry shipments—i.e., shipments from one manufacturing 
establishment to another.2  Labor input is measured as the simple sum of hours worked by 
employees of manufacturing establishments.   The growth in labor productivity across periods,    
is computed as  
                                                 
2 The output measure for U.S. manufacturing productivity statistics does not net out purchased material and 
services inputs, and thus it differs from the value-added concept of output used in the construction of U.S. aggregate 
business-sector labor productivity statistics.  In the treatment of outsourced and offshored material and services 
inputs, the labor productivity measures for the aggregate economy are more analogous to the multifactor productivity 
measures discussed below.   
0
tQ
Q
0
tL
L
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(2) 
1 1 1
ln ln ln .t t t
t t t
P Q L
P Q L− − −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
Thus, the percent change in productivity over time equals the percent change in output less the 
percent change in labor input, measured by hours worked.3   
 This simple measure of labor productivity has well-recognized limitations that make it 
difficult to interpret.  Increases in measured labor productivity may reflect the ability of workers 
to produce more with given amounts of other inputs, or they may reflect technological 
improvements—both of which accord with common conceptions of what drives labor 
productivity growth.  Alternatively, increases in measured labor productivity may simply reflect 
the substitution of other inputs for labor.  Of particular relevance to this paper, the outsourcing of 
labor to domestic contractors such as temporary help agencies or to foreign companies or 
affiliates will be measured as labor productivity gains rather than as the substitution of 
manufacturing labor for labor located in a different sector or in a different country. 
 
Multifactor Productivity Measures (KLEMS) 
 Multifactor productivity measures are designed to address this shortcoming of labor 
productivity measures.  KLEMS—which stands for capital (K), labor (L), energy (E), materials 
(M), and purchased business services (S)—is the multifactor productivity measure developed for 
U.S. manufacturing.4  KLEMS measures of U.S. manufacturing productivity have been 
computed on an annual basis for the 1987-to-2004 time period.  Conceptually, KLEMS measures 
                                                 
3 Taking the natural logarithm of a ratio approximates the percent difference of the numerator from the 
denominator.  
4 The methodology used for computing multifactor productivity for the private business sector is somewhat 
different than that used for manufacturing.  For a discussion of the methods and sources used in computing various 
multifactor productivity statistics, see BLS (1997).  
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not the change in labor productivity per se, but rather the change in productivity to all inputs 
used in the production process collectively.  KLEMS is computed as 
(3) 
1 1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln ln
− − − − −
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
t t t t t
k l ip
t t t t t
A Q K L IPw w w
A Q K L IP
, 
 
where                   denotes the change in multifactor productivity.  As with the manufacturing 
labor productivity measures, output in KLEMS, Q, is constant-dollar shipments net of inventory 
change and intraindustry shipments, and L is the summation of labor hours.  The measure of 
capital input is based on the flow of services from capital equipment, structures, land, and 
inventories.  Intermediate purchases (IP), which include material and energy inputs and 
purchased business services, are generally measured as current dollar values deflated by 
appropriate prices.  To compute multifactor productivity, the various inputs—or in this case log 
changes to the inputs—must be aggregated in some way: labor hours must be aggregated with 
purchased material inputs (such as kilowatt hours of energy consumed), purchased business 
services, and so forth.  The weights used in the multifactor productivity calculations—wk, wl, and 
wip—are computed as the average share of production costs in adjoining periods t and t−1.  Thus, 
the percent change in multifactor productivity simply equals the percent change in output less a 
weighted average of the percent change in all inputs, where the weights represent the average 
factor shares in the two periods.  
 While the use of factor cost shares is an intuitively plausible way to weight the percent 
changes of separate categories of inputs, under certain stringent assumptions such an aggregation 
has a theoretical justification.  These assumptions, taken from a simple general equilibrium 
model, include the supposition that all factors are paid their value marginal products—that is, the 
wage or payment made to an input factor reflects the value of output that an additional unit of the 
1
ln t
t
A
A −
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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input would generate.  As I argue below, however, productivity statistics capture a dynamic 
adjustment process for which such a simple general-equilibrium theoretical framework is likely 
to be particularly inapplicable and, where there is widespread substitution between input 
categories, complicate the interpretation of productivity statistics.   
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OUTSOURCING POSES FOR MULTIFACTOR 
PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES 
 
 Significant increases in outsourcing to domestic contractors or in offshoring parts of the 
production process to foreign companies or affiliates raise at least two concerns about 
multifactor productivity statistics in manufacturing.  One is purely a measurement issue. The 
second is a more fundamental methodological issue concerning precisely what the productivity 
index measures.   
Measurement Issues 
 Manufacturers that outsource functions reduce their own labor and capital inputs and 
increase purchased inputs. The accuracy of multifactor productivity measures requires that 
changes in purchased inputs be fully captured in the data.  In the case of domestic and 
international outsourcing, however, these purchased inputs are not well measured.  Collection of 
detailed data on inputs used by industries is difficult and expensive, and thus statistical agencies 
historically have focused their greatest resources on accurately measuring inputs deemed most 
important, like energy usage. Although the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) generates 
input-output tables that provide a comprehensive set of estimates of commodity use for all 
industries, these estimates are only as good as the underlying survey data, which often are thin. 
The crudeness of certain input estimates would not matter for productivity calculations as long as 
little substitution to or from these inputs is occurring.  However, the growth of domestic and 
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foreign outsourcing has raised concerns that inaccurate measurement of these inputs results in 
inaccurate measurement of productivity growth in various sectors and, particularly where there is 
foreign outsourcing, inaccurate measurement of productivity growth for the aggregate economy.  
 Here I present direct evidence that an important component of domestic outsourcing by 
manufacturers—the use of employment services, composed primarily of temporary help and 
leased employees—has been greatly underestimated in the statistics that generate KLEMS 
measures, potentially leading to an overstatement of productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing.  
In addition, I review reasons why government statistics likely understate offshoring and thus 
overstate productivity estimates for sectors and the aggregate economy.   
 In constructing KLEMS productivity statistics, BLS bases its estimates of employment 
services input to manufacturing on benchmark input-output (I-O) tables constructed by the BEA 
every five years; the most recently available benchmark tables are for 1997.5  In the 1997 
benchmark I-O tables, the estimate of manufacturers’ use of employment services was not based 
on direct evidence, but rather was imputed from data collected in the Business Expenses Survey 
(BES), which is administered to companies in the wholesale, retail, and services sectors.  
Companies completing the survey were asked to report their expenditures on contract labor, 
defined as “persons who are not on your payroll but are supplied through a contract with another 
company to perform specific jobs (e.g., temporary help, leased employees).”  It was assumed that 
companies answering this question reported expenditures on six types of contract services—
temporary help services, employee leasing services, security guards and patrol services, office 
administrative services, facility support services, and nonresidential building cleaning services—
and thus these services were treated as a bundled commodity.  Data on industry output in each of 
                                                 
5 BLS estimates annual I-O tables from these five-year benchmarks.  The 2002 benchmark I-O tables will 
be available in 2007. 
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these contract labor services industries came from the Economic Census and were aggregated to 
match the level of (assumed) commodity aggregation in the BES.  The residual of the contract-
labor services not accounted for by industries surveyed in the BES was imputed to industries not 
surveyed in the BES based on their output shares.  To generate I-O estimates at a more 
disaggregated commodity level, it was assumed that industries utilized all contract labor services 
in the same proportion.  For instance, if an industry was estimated to use 10 percent of all 
contract labor services, it was assumed to use 10 percent of each of the component contract 
services.   
While such an imputation would result in imprecise estimates of manufacturers’ 
expenditures on employment services, these estimates also may be biased for several reasons.  
Because evidence shows that manufacturers are disproportionately heavy users of staffing 
services, the assumption that industries not surveyed in the BES utilize all contract labor services 
in proportion to their output will result in an underestimate of staffing services for 
manufacturing.  In addition, the BES data only provide information on expenditures.  Output 
prices are estimated from input prices in user industries, which tend to overstate prices, 
understate quantities of inputs purchased, and hence overstate multifactor productivity growth 
(BLS 1996).  Moreover, contract labor is not clearly defined in the BES and arguably could 
include a larger set of contract work than assumed in the construction of the BEA I-O tables.  If 
this is the case, estimates of all contract labor services utilized by manufacturers would be 
systematically understated.   
 Available information indicates substantial bias in the imputation of the employment 
services input to manufacturing.  Estimates from the five Contingent Worker Supplements to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) show that 35–40 percent of temporary help agency workers 
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were assigned to manufacturing in the 1995–2005 period; Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006) 
estimate that 27–33 percent of employment services workers were assigned to manufacturers 
over the 1989–2004 period. These figures contrast with the much lower estimates that only about 
15 percent and 5 percent of employment services output was assigned as an input to the 
manufacturing sector in the 1992 and 1997 benchmark I-O tables, respectively.  The large 
decline in the fraction of employment services output imputed to manufacturing is particularly 
striking given evidence that manufacturers greatly increased their utilization of these services 
during that period (Segal and Sullivan 1997; Dey, Houseman, and Polivka 2006).    
 Government data used to estimate offshoring activities come from several sources.  U.S. 
trade statistics furnish detailed information on the importation of material goods, which BEA 
imputes to end users in its I-O tables.  The BEA conducts benchmark and annual surveys of 
cross-border trade in services with unaffiliated foreigners.  A separate BEA survey collects 
information on cross-border trade with affiliated foreigners.  Reporting of service transactions 
with unaffiliated foreigners is only required if the transaction exceeds $1 million or with 
affiliated services if the affiliate’s assets, sales, or net income exceed $30 million, raising 
concerns that services offshoring is significantly understated (GAO 2004).  Additional 
information about potential offshoring activities can be gleaned from data collected by the BEA 
on U.S. multinational companies, which report foreign direct investments and information on 
outsourced intermediate goods and services from domestic and foreign sources combined.  
Recent reports by the GAO (2004) and the National Academy of Public Administration (2006) 
have described gaps in data collection, benchmarking that occurs infrequently, and the lack of 
accurate price data with which to estimate the quantity of imported services. These and other  
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factors detailed in the reports may contribute to unreliability and underestimates of goods and 
services offshoring.  
 
Methodological Issues 
Pick something to move offshore today . . .  [In India you can get]  
quality work at 50 to 60% of the cost.  That’s two heads for the price  
of one. 
 
―Microsoft senior vice-president Brian Valentine, quoted in Lazonick (forthcoming) 
 
 The second concern with the productivity estimates is more fundamental and relates to 
the construction of these numbers and what counts as a productivity gain.  As noted above, the 
multifactor productivity calculation in Equation (3) can be derived from a simple general 
equilibrium model. For the multifactor productivity numbers generated from Equation (3) to 
have a clean theoretical interpretation, the assumptions of this general equilibrium model must 
hold, including the assumption that all factors are paid their marginal product and hence that 
differences in factor prices solely reflect differences in factor productivity.6  Although such 
simplifying assumptions are perhaps necessary to construct a tractable model for the purposes of 
estimating aggregate productivity statistics, such a general equilibrium model arguably is ill-
suited for capturing the dynamic adjustment process that intrinsically underlies productivity 
changes.  The model’s assumptions are not innocuous.   
 As the above quotation illustrates, an important reason manufacturers outsource or 
offshore work is to save on labor costs.  Because of technical innovations, removal of barriers to 
trade, or some other market change, it may become profitable for companies to engage in factor 
                                                 
6 The assumption that factors are paid their value marginal product, in turn, derives from assumptions that 
product, labor, and other input markets are perfectly competitive, that inputs are substitutable in the production 
process, and hence that these marginal values are observable.  The model also assumes that the production process is 
characterized by constant returns to scale. 
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price arbitrage, exploiting differences in the cost of hiring labor across sectors within the country 
or across countries.  A unionized company or a company with historically high labor costs may 
utilize a staffing agency to lower wages, benefits, workers’ compensation, and other nonwage 
labor costs.  This strategy is exemplified in recent agreements between the Ford Motor Company 
and its employees’ union, the United Auto Workers, to utilize staffing agency workers at its 
plants to handle low-skilled work (McCracken 2007).  Staffing agency workers earn a fraction of 
the wages and benefits of direct-hire unionized employees.  The documented growth in imported 
material inputs and the offshoring of services is widely attributed to the lower costs of skilled 
and unskilled foreign labor and to technological changes and the removal of trade barriers, which 
allow companies to exploit these lower labor costs.  If, for instance, a company substitutes 
lower-cost, but equally productive, contract (foreign or domestic) labor for its own employees, 
output per worker hour will not have changed from the company’s perspective, but cost savings 
from the shift to contract labor will be counted as a net reduction in inputs used and thus a 
productivity gain (Equation [3]).  This occurs because contract labor is treated as a separate input 
(IP) from employees hired directly by the company (L), and when the company substitutes 
contract for direct-hire labor, the increase in the cost share of contract labor (wip) does not match 
the reduction in the cost share of direct-hire labor (wl).7  
 In practice, a company may lower costs by shifting to less productive but substantially 
lower-cost contract labor, and from the company’s perspective output per worker hour would 
fall, but measured productivity in Equation (3) would rise.  Such a case is nicely illustrated in a 
recent report by McKinsey & Company (2006), which compares the research and development 
                                                 
7 Although this article pertains to manufacturing productivity, it is also the case that pure labor cost savings from 
offshoring are likewise measured as productivity gains in the value-added concept of labor productivity and in 
multifactor productivity measures for the aggregate economy.   
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costs that Cisco Systems, (the world’s leading producer of networking equipment) incurs by 
developing switching routers through its own U.S.-based engineers with the costs incurred by 
outsourcing the research and development to a Chinese company, Huawei Net Engine.  
According to McKinsey & Company’s estimates, the amount of work hours required by 
Huawei’s engineers to develop the product is roughly double that required by Cisco engineers, 
but because labor costs of Chinese engineers are dramatically lower than those of American 
engineers, McKinsey estimates that the cost of R&D in China is about one-fifth that in the 
United States.  If Cisco outsourced the R&D to China and actual work hours were measured as 
labor input, labor and multifactor productivity would fall.  However, because Chinese contract 
labor is treated as a separate input and weighted by its cost share, multifactor productivity 
measures increase.   
 Institutional barriers or other types of adjustment costs typically would preclude the 
profit-maximizing firm from instantaneously shifting all of a particular type of labor input from 
direct-hire employees to lower-cost contract labor, even if this was the profit-maximizing 
outcome in the end.  What we observe in practice is the shift in staffing patterns over time away 
from direct-hire employees toward contract labor.  Note that even if one assumes, as is consistent 
with neoclassical economic assumptions, that the cost of using contract labor, including 
adjustment costs, equals its value marginal product for the “marginal” or last hired worker at 
each point in time, the shift in staffing patterns presumably would result in some cost savings to 
the firm; formally, the firm would realize labor cost savings on the “inframarginal” contract 
labor that it hires.  And in Equation (3) such cost savings will be counted as a productivity gain 
because, in aggregating across inputs, direct-hire labor and contract labor are weighted by their 
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cost shares, and the decline in the cost share of the former will exceed the rise in the cost share 
of the latter.   
 Should such cost savings be counted as productivity gains?  As such gains are 
traditionally defined in manufacturing productivity statistics, the answer is probably no.  
Currently, the measurement of labor input in productivity statistics somewhat artificially depends 
on the legal status of the employment relationship. As noted above, a company could save 
money by outsourcing labor but use more labor hours to produce the same output.  Particularly 
in the case of foreign outsourcing, however, one might argue that such cost savings represent a 
net gain in resources for the company, the sector, or the aggregate economy. For instance, the 
ability to exploit cheap (relative to workers’ hourly output) foreign labor might be seen as a 
productivity gain that results from technical innovations that reduce transportation and 
communication costs, although imperfections in product and input markets and the transfer of 
technology and know-how resulting from trade may erode net gains to the economy as a whole.8 
 Even if it is desirable to measure outsourced labor as labor rather than as a separate 
intermediate input in productivity statistics, as a practical matter it would be difficult and in 
some cases impossible to do so.  These different input categories must be aggregated, and the use 
of cost shares is a straightforward, intuitively plausible way to do so.  It should be recognized, 
however, that current productivity measures include savings that result purely from lower hourly 
costs of outsourced labor, and that this fact has potentially important implications for the 
                                                 
8 For instance, if workers who are displaced by offshoring experience significant unemployment spells or 
other costs in finding new jobs, and if those costs are not taken into account by companies in their decision to 
offshore tasks, the net gain to the American economy from offshoring would be less than the gain realized by the 
companies engaged in offshoring.  Samuelson (2004) argues that over time free trade can result in a deterioration in 
a country’s terms of trade and hence lower its welfare if the trade promotes technological and productivity gains 
among the country’s trading partners.  This type of logic is commonly used to argue that developed countries will 
not necessarily benefit from the globalization of production if such trade promotes skill development and 
technological progress in countries such as India and China.  For a discussion of worker dislocation costs and a 
rebuttal to Samuelson’s argument, see OECD (2006).   
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interpretation of measured productivity gains and how these gains are distributed among workers 
and capital.   
 
THE EFFECTS OF OUTSOURCING ON PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN 
MANUFACTURING: SOME SUGGESTIVE EVIDENCE 
 
 As is evident from the above discussion, the growth in outsourcing or offshoring likely 
will lead to an increase in measured productivity in manufacturing, even in the KLEMS 
multifactor productivity measures.  Poor measurement of domestic and foreign outsourcing may 
result in systematic understatement of the amount of outsourcing that occurs in aggregate or in 
the manufacturing sector.  Moreover, the use of factor cost shares to weight the growth of factor 
inputs implies that unless differences in factor payments solely reflect differences in the value 
added by these factors of production, an assumption that is particularly unrealistic in the case of 
domestic and foreign outsourcing, cost savings that result purely from the lower prices of 
outsourced labor will be counted as productivity gains.  This fact has potentially important 
implications for the interpretation of productivity statistics.  These effects on measured 
productivity would be of little concern if they were empirically small.  Although I have no 
definitive information on the size of the effects, I present evidence that suggests they are 
significant and warrant serious attention.   
The Contribution of Staffing Services Outsourcing to Manufacturing Productivity  
 The first piece of evidence pertains to the effect of manufacturing’s outsourcing to 
employment services on manufacturing productivity estimates.  Matthew Dey, Anne Polivka, 
and I have constructed annual estimates of workers from staffing agencies (the employment 
services industry) that were assigned to manufacturers from 1989 to 2004, using data from the 
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Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program, the Current Employment Statistics (CES) 
program, and the Contingent Worker Supplements to the CPS (Dey, Houseman, and Polivka 
2006).  We estimate that the number of workers in the employment services sector grew from 
419,000 in 1989 to a peak of more than 1.4 million in 2000.  In relative terms, employment 
services workers added an estimated 2.3 percent to manufacturing employment in 1989 and an 
estimated 8.2 percent in 2000.  From 2000 to 2001 employment services bore a disproportionate 
share of the employment reductions in manufacturing.  Following 2001, staffing services 
assigned to manufacturing expanded while employment in manufacturing continued to decline 
sharply.  As a result, we estimate that by 2004 employment services added 8.7 percent to 
manufacturing employment, although the number of employment services workers in 
manufacturing was still below its peak level of 2000. In other words, our estimates indicate that 
staffing services workers make up a significant and growing share of the dwindling number of 
manufacturing jobs remaining in the United States.  These figures imply that it is important to 
accurately account for outsourcing to the staffing sector when computing multifactor 
productivity for manufacturing.     
 Using employment in manufacturing with and without adjustments for outsourcing to 
employment services, I estimate the contribution of this type of outsourcing to labor productivity 
in manufacturing.  Specifically, I reestimate Equation (2) using employment estimates that 
include workers in employment services assigned to manufacturing as follows:    
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The difference in the rate of growth in measured labor productivity from Equation (2) and the 
rate of growth in the adjusted measure of labor productivity from Equation (4) shows the 
contribution of employment services outsourcing to productivity growth in manufacturing.   
 A couple of features of these estimates should be noted.  First, because the OES data we 
use to generate estimates report number of workers, not hours worked, the labor productivity 
measures I compute pertain to output per worker, not output per hour, which is the more 
common labor productivity measure.  Particularly over the time horizons that I am examining, 
changes in output per worker and output per hour in manufacturing are very similar.  In addition, 
data from the CPS Contingent Worker Supplements indicate that the average number of weekly 
hours worked in the preceding week by temporary agency workers assigned to manufacturing is 
only slightly below the average number of weekly hours worked by direct-hire manufacturing 
workers in comparable occupations.  Three occupations—production workers, laborers and 
helpers, and office and administrative workers—account for 75–80 percent of all staffing agency 
workers assigned to manufacturing.  Within each of these occupations, temporary agency 
workers assigned to manufacturing worked an average of 8 percent fewer hours weekly than 
direct hires in manufacturing did.  In some estimates reported below, I take into account 
differences in hours worked when computing adjusted labor productivity figures.9 
                                                 
9 Specifically, I multiply the number of workers in a particular occupation assigned to manufacturing by the 
ratio of hours worked by temporary agency workers and direct-hire employees in a particular occupation category.  
For instance, if temporary agency production workers’ hours were on average 0.92 that of direct-hire production 
workers’ hours, I count each staffing agency production worker assigned to manufacturing as just 0.92 of a worker.  
Most of the difference in weekly hours between temporary agency and direct-hire workers employed in the same 
occupation probably stems from the fact that temporary agency workers are more likely to begin or terminate a job 
during the course of the week in which hours are measured.  Because PEO workers are permanently assigned to an 
organization, their weekly hours should not differ from those of direct-hire workers, and hence the Table 1 figures 
that adjust for hours worked, if anything, probably overstate the importance of differences in hours worked between 
staffing agency workers and direct-hire employees in productivity calculations.   
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Second, productivity estimates are computed on fourth quarter, not annual, data to 
correspond with the timing of the OES survey.10  Labor productivity growth can be sensitive to 
the endpoints used. For instance, because manufacturing was beginning to slow down by the 
fourth quarter of 2000, the estimates of labor productivity growth are lower when computed from 
fourth quarter 1995 to fourth quarter 2000 than when computed using annual data for the same 
years. For this reason, I report estimates over varying time periods to check the sensitivity of the 
findings to the endpoints used.  
 The three columns in the top panel of Table 1 display the annual growth rate in labor 
productivity (output per worker), the growth rate in labor productivity adjusting for the use of 
employment services workers, and the contribution of employment services outsourcing to 
manufacturing labor productivity growth.  Over the 1990 to 2000 period, outsourcing to 
employment services accounted for about a half-percentage point of the growth in the labor 
productivity measure, or about 15 percent of that growth. The contribution of employment 
services to manufacturing productivity growth was larger during the latter part of the period than 
for the early part of the period, and this finding is robust to the endpoints used in the analysis.  
Adjusting for lower hours worked per week by staffing agency workers has little impact on the 
estimates and does not affect the qualitative nature of the findings.  Note that although 
accounting for employment services workers generally results in a reduction in estimated 
manufacturing labor productivity growth rates, it results in a higher estimated productivity 
growth during the 2000–2001 downturn, reflecting the fact that temporary agency workers bore 
the brunt of adjustment to the recession.   
                                                 
10 In the past, the OES was conducted each year in November.  Since 2002, the OES has been conducted 
twice annually, once in March and once in November. 
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 The bottom panel of Table 1 reproduces figures reported in BLS (2004), which are based 
on calculations from KLEMS.  The three columns show reported labor productivity growth 
(output per hour), productivity growth adjusted for purchased business services, and the 
contribution of purchased services to the rate of labor productivity growth.  The computations 
are based on annual rather than fourth-quarter data, and the definition of productivity is output 
per hour rather than output per worker.  More important, the KLEMS estimates in the bottom 
panel adjust manufacturing labor productivity for all of purchased services, which include not 
only employment services but also services purchased from domestic contractors in other sectors 
and from offshoring.  It is widely believed that during this period manufacturers increasingly 
adopted strategies to outsource and offshore, and hence, all else equal, the productivity 
adjustments for purchased services from KLEMS in the bottom panel should be greater than the 
adjustments based solely on outsourcing to employment services.   
 The numbers presented in the top and bottom panels of Table 1 portray inconsistent 
pictures of the role outsourcing played in manufacturing productivity growth during the 1990s.  
The KLEMS estimate of the contribution of all purchased services to productivity growth in the 
early 1990s is about the same as the estimated contribution of employment services by itself, 
reported in the top panel. More strikingly, in the latter half of the 1990s, the estimated 
contribution of purchased services from KLEMS is much lower than the estimated contribution 
of employment services alone.  In addition, while the estimates in the top panel show a 
substantial increase in the contribution of employment services outsourcing to labor productivity 
growth in the 1990s, those in the bottom panel show a substantial decline.   
The conclusion in BLS (2004)—that outsourcing and offshoring had minor effects on 
productivity growth in manufacturing and played no role in the acceleration of manufacturing 
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labor productivity during the 1990s—simply is not supported by estimates based on data 
generated in Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006).  It appears unlikely that differences in 
productivity concepts (output per worker vs. output per hour) and the time periods over which 
they are measured explain these inconsistencies.  Rather, the low estimates of employment 
services output imputed to manufacturing in the BEA I-O tables used to generate the KLEMS 
figures suggest that the differences in the measurement of outsourcing are at least partly 
responsible for the discrepancies. As noted above, the share of the employment services imputed 
to the manufacturing industry was just 15 percent in the 1992 BEA I-O benchmark table, and it 
fell even further, to 5 percent, in the 1997 benchmark table.  The extraordinarily low estimate of 
manufacturers’ use of employment services in the 1997 I-O benchmark—at a time when all other 
data pointed to a large increase in manufacturers’ outsourcing to the staffing industry—could 
help explain why BLS (2004) found that none of the acceleration in manufacturing labor 
productivity was attributable to outsourcing. 
 Figure 1 displays indices of employment and output in U.S. manufacturing from 1989 to 
2004.  The growing gap between the employment and output indexes measures the growth in 
simple labor productivity, defined as output per worker.  A third line depicts manufacturing 
employment adjusted to take into account outsourcing to the staffing services sector, as reported 
in Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006).  As is evident, outsourcing to staffing services can 
explain some of the phenomenal growth in U.S. labor productivity in the manufacturing sector, 
but by no means most of it.  Other factors that potentially explain the remaining gap include 
technological improvements including automation, outsourcing to other domestic contractors, 
and offshoring of services and production of intermediate inputs.   The remainder of the paper 
focuses on the potential contribution of the last category.  
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Evidence on the Contribution of Services Offshoring to Multifactor Productivity Growth: 
Real or Mismeasurement? 
 
 A recent study by Amiti and Wei (2006) found a strong association between offshoring 
of services and productivity growth.  Amiti and Wei concluded that services offshoring 
accounted for 11–13 percent of the growth in manufacturing labor productivity from 1992 to 
2000.  They used a value-added concept of labor productivity that, in theory, netted out increased 
material and services inputs from offshoring on the labor productivity measure.   
 Although this study has data shortcomings acknowledged by the authors, the larger point 
is that in spite of the relatively low levels of services offshoring, the authors’ estimates of 
imported services in manufacturing industries are strongly correlated with industry productivity 
growth.  Offshoring genuinely may lead to some increased productivity among American 
workers through the channels suggested by the authors.  One channel is through compositional 
effects in which production remaining in the United States focuses on tasks in which U.S. 
workers are more efficient.  Another occurs through the importation of services that make 
American workers more efficient. But the surprisingly large estimated effects of services 
offshoring on manufacturing productivity raise concerns that measurement problems underlie the 
paper’s findings. Because data understate the amount of services offshoring taking place with 
U.S. businesses and because recent expansion of services offshoring is motivated to a large 
degree by the lower wages of foreign labor, the large amount of manufacturing productivity 
growth that the authors attribute to services offshoring may, in part, be from picking up error in 
the measurement of manufacturing productivity and pure labor cost savings, not from the 
increased efficiency per se of American workers.   
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High Productivity Growth and Extensive Outsourcing and Offshoring in High-Tech 
Industries  
 
“The personal computer on your desk today may have been 
designed in Taiwan and assembled in Mexico, with memory 
chips from South Korea, a motherboard from China, and a 
hard drive from Thailand.” (Agrawal, Farrell, and Remes 
2003) 
 
 Of special concern is evidence that productivity growth in the 1990s was concentrated in 
the high-tech sector, a sector that pioneered outsourcing and offshoring practices. From 1990 to 
2000, output per labor hour increased by 45 percent for all of manufacturing, while this simple 
labor productivity measure increased by 426 percent in computer and electronic product 
manufacturing.  Moreover, labor productivity growth in the semiconductor and computer 
manufacturing industries far outpaced that in the rest of the computer and electronic product 
manufacturing sector. From 1990 to 2000, labor productivity increased by 961 percent in 
semiconductors and by an astounding 1,495 percent in computers.  Since 2000, labor 
productivity in these two industries has continued to soar (Figure 2).   
 Multifactor productivity measures, which should net out increased inputs from 
outsourcing and offshoring, show a similar picture, with measured multifactor productivity 
growth in computer and electronic manufacturing dwarfing growth in manufacturing as a whole 
(Figure 3).  Reflecting these facts, Oliner and Sichel (2000) show that much of aggregate labor 
productivity growth was attributable not only to the adoption of high-tech capital, which 
embodies the technological advances of computers and semiconductors, but also to productivity 
growth in the industries that produce computers and semiconductors.  Oliner and Sichel estimate 
that production of computers and semiconductors accounted for 58 percent of multifactor 
productivity growth from 1991 to 1995, for 56 percent of multifactor productivity growth from 
1996 to 1999, and for about 36 percent of the acceleration in the productivity growth between 
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the early 1990s and the late 1990s.11  Oliner and Sichel note that these percentages are 
extraordinary given the tiny share of current dollar output computers and semiconductors 
account for in the aggregate economy.   
 Schweitzer and Zaman (2006), justifying the concentration of productivity growth in 
these two industries, write that “advances in chip technology are widely acknowledged as having 
driven the dramatic productivity gains in the semiconductor sector and, in turn, the computer 
equipment sector.”  However, others have questioned whether the productivity gains in the 
production of high-tech equipment—as distinct from productivity gains that result from the use 
of computer and other high-tech equipment in other sectors—are exaggerated.  Various factors 
could contribute to the high productivity numbers in high-tech industries.  For example, the 
difficulty of accurately measuring output and prices in industries characterized by such rapid 
technological progress in the product produced has been much discussed and could result in 
substantial mismeasurement.12  Here, I focus on the possible contributions of outsourcing and 
offshoring to the high productivity estimates in the IT sector.   
Several case studies have documented the innovations in business strategy that originated 
in the IT sector, including the offshoring of the manufacturing process, the offshoring of 
services, and the extensive use of temporary help staffing and other contract workers for much of 
the work that remained in the United States (Ernst and O’Connor 1992; Hyde 2003; Lazonick 
forthcoming).  Much of the actual manufacturing of computer equipment had been offshored by 
                                                 
11 Similarly, according to BLS estimates, two manufacturing industries, Industrial and Commercial 
Machinery (SIC 35) and Electronic Machinery (SIC 36), accounted for 71 percent and 69 percent of multifactor 
productivity growth over the 1990–1995 and 1995–2000 periods, respectively, and almost half of the acceleration of 
productivity growth between the two periods. These estimates are from an unpublished BLS document dated 
October 21, 2004. Under the old SIC classification system, computer equipment manufacturers were grouped in SIC 
35 and semiconductor equipment manufacturing was coded in SIC 36; now both form part of NAICS 334. 
12 See, for example, Aizorbe (2005); Aizcorbe, Oliner, and Sichel (2006); Basu et al. (2005); and Feenstra 
et al. (2005).  
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the early 1990s to developing countries in order to access cheap labor (Ernst and O’Connor 
1992).  Slaughter (2002) more generally discusses the growth of global production networks in 
high-tech industries.  He presents evidence of the increase in the shares of inputs that were 
imported in various industries through the mid-1990s, though the import data distinguishing 
input from final goods production are limited.  Several WTO agreements that reduced trade 
barriers in the high-tech sector and that coincided with the acceleration of productivity growth in 
that sector in the latter half of the 1990s should, if anything, have further stimulated global 
production networks.13  In addition, employment remaining in this country was heavily 
outsourced to staffing agencies, other contract workers, and independent contractors (Hyde 
2003).  More recently, the high-tech sector took the lead in the offshoring of high-skilled jobs in 
order to access inexpensive skilled labor in developing countries, a development made possible 
by innovations in communications, in particular the Internet (Lazonick forthcoming).   
During the 1990s output in the computer and electronic product manufacturing sector 
soared while measured labor hours in the sector remained flat.  Since 2000, output has been flat, 
while labor hours have declined sharply.  Little can be assessed from these figures about actual 
productivity growth, however, because so much of the labor input is not employed in this sector, 
but rather in other domestic industries and in foreign companies or affiliates.  An accurate count 
of this labor and purchased materials input is critical to an accurate assessment of the sector’s 
productivity growth.  Yet, as detailed above, because measurement of outsourcing and offshoring 
is poor in U.S. statistics, it is possible that multifactor productivity growth in high-tech industries 
is significantly overstated. In addition, to the extent that expansion of the production of IT 
                                                 
13 Slaughter (2002) provides a good discussion of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO Information Technology Agreement, and the WTO Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement.  He makes a strong case that offshoring is in large part responsible for productivity 
gains in the U.S. IT sector.  Slaughter mentions the role that lower foreign labor costs may have played in increasing 
measured productivity but does not develop the implications of this point. 
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equipment was occurring disproportionately in low-wage countries, cost savings or “gains from 
trade” from offshoring would be counted as productivity gains.14  The fact that domestic prices 
were adjusted to reflect improvements in the quality of IT products, but import prices of 
intermediate IT inputs were not, further exacerbates the problem. Although any distortions from 
outsourcing and offshoring on productivity measurement in high-tech industries may have had 
little effect on the measurement of aggregate productivity growth, special investigation of this 
issue should be undertaken, particularly given this sector’s role in driving recent productivity 
growth in the U.S. economy. 
 
WHY UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING 
ON MANUFACTURING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IS IMPORTANT 
 
The manufacturing sector has accounted for much of the high productivity growth in the 
U.S. economy in the last decade.  In addition, manufacturing, more than any other sector, is 
subject to pressures from international competition, and productivity growth is an important 
indicator of its global competitiveness. Accurately measuring and interpreting productivity in 
this key sector is arguably important in and of itself.   
Any biases to manufacturing productivity statistics introduced by domestic outsourcing, 
however, likely will net out in aggregate productivity statistics: labor hours not counted in 
manufacturing will be counted in services and the two will cancel each other out (BLS 2004).15  
                                                 
14 Feenstra, et al. (2006) also point to the extensive offshoring of the production of IT equipment as a 
possible culprit for the implausibly large productivity gains in the industry. They suggest that product price indexes 
used in the computation of productivity statistics are not adjusted quickly enough to account for exchange rate 
changes, and hence, gains from trade due to exchange rate changes may be counted as productivity gains.  They find 
relatively little empirical support for their hypothesis, however.   
15 In a different twist on this theme, ten Raa and Wolff (2001) argue that manufacturing productivity growth 
may reflect the outsourcing of services, in which productivity growth is slower, and thus that the acceleration of 
productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing is simply an accounting phenomenon.    
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By implication, to the extent that economists and policymakers are focused on aggregate rather 
than on sector productivity figures, domestic outsourcing is not of major concern.16    
Any overstatement of manufacturing productivity growth resulting from underestimates 
of offshored materials and services inputs clearly will not wash out in aggregate statistics.  
Moreover, companies are moving production and service jobs offshore in large part to exploit 
cheap (relative to their output) skilled and unskilled labor.  In as much as lower hourly foreign 
labor costs are not matched by lower productivity, cost savings from offshoring will be counted 
as productivity gains.  To the extent that offshoring is an important source of measured 
productivity growth in the economy, productivity statistics will, in part, be capturing cost 
savings or gains to trade but not improvements in the output of American labor and should be 
interpreted with caution.   
 While economic theory holds that improvement in a population’s standard of living is 
directly tied to its productivity growth, one of the great puzzles of the American economy in 
recent years has been the fact that large productivity gains have not broadly benefited workers in 
the form of higher wages (Dew-Becker and Gordon 2005, Yellen 2006).  A better understanding 
of what our productivity statistics actually measure potentially provides some answers to this 
puzzle.  Although a number of economists have suggested that offshoring may partly explain 
why many Americans have not enjoyed real wage gains during this period of rapid productivity 
growth, a contribution of this paper is to suggest a direct link between productivity measurement, 
offshoring, and inequality.  It is possible that because of poor measurement of imported 
intermediate inputs, especially services, productivity measures are inflated.  Moreover, even 
                                                 
16  One caveat to this conclusion is that labor input is not treated uniformly in aggregate multifactor 
productivity statistics.  Rather, labor is treated as 1,008 separate inputs in the production process, with changes in 
each weighted according to its cost share.  If the distribution of outsourced labor across these labor categories differs 
from that of the labor it displaces and if domestic contract labor has lower wages that are not fully matched by lower 
productivity, then domestic outsourcing by manufacturers will also inflate aggregate productivity statistics.    
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when offshored materials and services inputs are accurately measured, productivity 
improvements that result from offshoring may largely measure cost savings, not improvements 
to output per hour worked by American labor.  Productivity trends may be an indicator not of 
how productive American workers are compared to foreign workers, but rather of how cost-
uncompetitive many are vis-à-vis foreign labor.  Although the productivity numbers may capture 
some net gains to the American economy from trade, there is no reason to believe that these 
gains will be broadly shared among workers.  The very process of offshoring to cheap foreign 
labor places downward pressure on many domestic workers’ wages and simultaneously increases 
measured productivity through cost savings.   
 The potential implications of this source of measured productivity gain are not purely 
distributional, however.  Undoubtedly it matters for the long-term performance of the U.S. 
economy whether productivity improvements arise from smarter, more efficient American 
workers, from investment in capital equipment, or from the use of cheap foreign labor.  While 
more accurate productivity statistics should be sought through improved measurement of 
imported materials and services inputs, research should also seek to measure the contribution of 
various factors—including pure cost savings from offshoring—to measured productivity gains.  
By so doing it can provide the basis for a better understanding of the relationship between 
productivity growth and economic performance at the sector and aggregate levels. 
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Table 1:  Comparison of Manufacturing Labor Productivity Growth Adjusted for Staffing 
Services to KLEMS Computations, 1990–2001 
 Adjustments for employment servicesa 
Time period 
Annual growth rate of 
labor productivity 
Labor productivity 
adjusted for  
employment services  
Contribution of 
employment 
services  
1990–2000 3.71 3.17 0.55 
    
1990–1995 3.96 3.48 0.48 
1990–1995, adj. for hoursb 3.96 3.52 0.44 
1989–1995 3.72 3.30 0.42 
    
1995–2000 3.52 2.90 0.61 
1995–2000, adj. for hoursb 3.52 2.95 0.57 
1995–1999 4.07 3.37 0.70 
    
2000–2001 2.14 3.33 −1.19 
    
 Adjustments for all purchased services, based on KLEMSc 
    
Time period 
Annual growth rate of 
labor productivity 
Labor productivity 
adjusted for purchased 
services 
Contribution of 
purchased services
1990–1995 3.3 2.8 0.5 
    
1995–2000 4.1 3.9 0.2 
    
2000–2001 1.2 1.6 −0.4 
    
aCalculations are based on output per person, 4th quarter data, and only adjust for Employment Services.  
bAdjusted labor productivity figures take into account fewer hours worked by Employment Services workers. 
cKLEMS calculations are based on output per person, annual averages, and adjust for all purchased services. 
 
Sources: top panel: author’s calculations using data from Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006); bottom panel: BLS 
(2004, Table 1). 
 
 33
 
  
Figure 1: Trends in U.S. Manufacturing Employment and Output
 (Indexes, 1992=100)
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Sources: author calculations based on data from Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
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 Figure 2: Labor Productivity, All Manufacturing and Computer and 
Electronic Equipment, 1987–2004 (Indexes 1990=100)
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Source: author calculations based on data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 3: Multifactor Productivity, All Manufacturing Computer and 
Electronic Equipment, 1987–2004 (Indexes, 1990 = 100)
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Source: author calcuations based on data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
 
 
 
 
